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Abstract 
In this essay, I scrutinize the ‘Global Britain’ project championed by the UK government since 
the Brexit vote and reflect on the role played by business schools in it. My argument is twofold. 
Firstly, I contend the project is bound up with British imperialism, being at once the expression 
of a melancholic attachment to the colonial Empire of yesteryear and part of a long-standing 
effort to renew Britain’s imperial greatness in the so-called ‘postcolonial’ era. Secondly, I 
maintain that business schools, while notionally anti-Brexit, are complicit in the Global Britain 
project by virtue of propagating elements of its imperialist discourse. I conclude with some 
reflections on our role as scholars and educators in fostering debate on this project and 
challenging its imperialist underbelly.  
 
  
Introduction 
Since the Brexit vote in 2016, the UK government has advocated the notion of ‘Global Britain’ 
as a post-European vision for the country. The concept remains ill-defined1 but is generally 
used to mean a Britain whose international political-economic relations are not European but, 
as in the days of the British Empire, global in scope. EU membership is seen to have curtailed 
Britain’s prosperity while also dissolving the country’s sense of (Great) Britishness, leading 
the government to argue that, therefore, ‘it is time for Britain to get out into the world and 
rediscover its role as a great, global trading nation’ (May, 2017).2 As part of this, the 
government recommends that Britain becomes ‘one of the firmest advocates for free trade 
anywhere in the world’ (May, 2017); embraces more fully ‘emerging markets’; and strengthens 
links with countries that share a ‘common’ culture, i.e. Commonwealth nations and, of course, 
the USA.  
 
The language of ‘Global Britain’ has become common parlance in British politics, business 
and the media, and is also rapidly finding its way into the higher education sector. Here, the 
view is that UK universities should be ‘among the leading flag-bearers for Global Britain’ 
(Baty, 2016), an opinion increasingly shared, if not informed by, university leaders themselves. 
For instance, the University of Sussex vice-chancellor has argued that ‘UK universities could 
be vital in promoting “global Britain” around the world’ and urged the sector to think about 
their power to do so (Tickell, cited in Morgan, 2018). In the same vein, writing for the Foreign 
Office’s Global Britain blog, the vice-chancellor of the University Reading declared that his 
institution was ‘proud to fly the flag for UK higher education overseas – taking the best of our 
home institutions to the world’ (Bell, 2017). Thus, and paradoxically, universities, while 
generally anti-Brexit, are being rapidly absorbed in the ‘Global Britain’ project.   
 
In this essay, I scrutinize this project and reflect on the role played by business schools in it. 
My argument is twofold. Firstly, I contend the project is inextricably bound up with British 
imperialism. It is at once an expression of the ‘postcolonial melancholia’ (Gilroy, 2004) 
afflicting British society since the dissolution of the Empire and part of a long-standing effort 
to renew the country’s ‘imperial greatness’ in the so-called ‘postcolonial’ era. As part of this, 
                                                          
1 An inquiry by the Foreign Affairs Committee (2018) found that the policy’s objectives and the timescale for its 
development and implementation remain unclear. 
2 This view is rooted in the longer-standing discourse of the ‘Anglosphere’ (see Kenny and Pearce, 2018; 
Vucetic, 2011). 
the project conveniently erases the egregious inequities, immiseration and violence which 
accompanied the growth and free trading of the Empire while also intensifying overseas 
military interventionism to achieve its goals. Secondly, based on this analysis, I maintain that 
business schools, while notionally anti-Brexit, are complicit in the Global Britain project by 
virtue of propagating elements of its imperialist discourse. They not only nurture an 
unquestioned commitment to ‘free trade’ but also efface the centrality of imperialism to such 
trade in the past and present. I conclude with some reflections on our role as scholars and 
educators in fostering debate on this project and challenging its imperialist underbelly.  
 
Building Global Britain 
The Global Britain project is puzzling in that when Britain was ‘global’ and ‘one of the firmest 
advocates for free trade’, it was a major colonial empire, one whose reach stretched from Africa 
and the Americas to Asia and Australasia, and also Europe if we include the colonisation of 
Ireland. In wanting the UK to rediscover itself as a great global trading entity, the advocates of 
Global Britain thus betray a nostalgia for the Empire of yesteryear (cf. Lis, 2017). Such 
nostalgia is most clearly seen in the Brexiteers’ vision of Britain trading across the 
Commonwealth as an alternative to trading with Europe. It is also evident in their imperialist 
idiom. For instance, a few months before the Brexit vote, UKIP3 declared that ‘[o]utside the 
EU, the world is our oyster, and the Commonwealth remains that precious pearl within’ 
(Carver, 2016). Along similar lines, in a speech delivered on 29 September 2016, Liam Fox, 
Secretary of State for International Trade, reminded his audience how a ‘small island perched 
on the edge of Europe became the world’s largest and most powerful trading nation’ (Fox, 
2016). In the same vein, conservative business-focused newspaper City A.M. enthusiastically 
referred to Brexit as paving the way for a ‘new Elizabethan age’ (Hulsman and Frayne, 2017).  
 
Unacknowledged in such nostalgia is the underbelly of the Empire (see e.g. Gott, 2011; also, 
Andrews, 2017; El-Enany, 2016). Here, it is useful to recall that the Elizabethan era 
unreflexively invoked by the Brexiteers was a time when Britain gained increased confidence 
and prosperity on the back of the transatlantic slave trade – a practice that continued until the 
mid-19th century. This was also when the British Queen chartered several trading companies 
to do business around the world, including the infamous Honourable East India Company, 
                                                          
3 UK Independence Party. This party was a major force behind the Brexit vote and has been a strong supporter 
of the ‘Global Britain’ project. 
which, ‘[f]or a century, […] conquered, subjugated and plundered vast tracts of south Asia’ 
(Dalrymple, 2015). A good part of the Commonwealth – the ‘pearl’ within ‘our oyster’ – 
emerged from centuries of genocidal settler colonialism in lands now called Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and the USA. Fast forward to the early 20th century and one finds the Empire 
committing numerous atrocities in other parts of the ‘Commonwealth’: the Boer concentration 
camps in South Africa (1899-1902); the Amritsar massacres (1919) and the Bengal famine 
(1943) in India; and the torture of Mau Mau rebels in Kenya (1951–1960), to name but a few. 
Throughout this period, Britain was indeed a champion of free trade but, in practice, this meant 
the country freely selling its manufactures globally while keeping her colonies in ‘a state of 
infancy and vassalage’ (Friedrich List, quoted in Palen, 2016: 6), as I elaborate below.  
 
Against this background, one must question the Global Britain project and related claim that 
‘free trade has, and will continue to, transform the world for the better’ (Fox, 2017). In the 
media, the project is often dismissed as mere nostalgia, with some also seeing such nostalgia 
as being ‘undergirded by a pervasive collective amnesia, almost as if the country has forgotten 
– within a mere generation – of the existence of its imperial past’ (Koram and Nisancioglu, 
2017). In this vein, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times contends ‘the British 
have largely consigned the whole imperial experience to George Orwell’s “memory hole”. 
Most British people, including leading politicians, are profoundly ignorant of the country’s 
imperial history’ (Rachman, 2017). If memory loss is the culprit, it may be more accurate to 
speak of ‘selective amnesia’ since what appears to have been forgotten is not so much Britain’s 
imperial past – the language of the Brexiteers is suffused with imperial imagery – but rather 
the violence and exploitation it engendered. Indeed, and troublingly, according to a YouGov 
survey, most Britons feel proud of the Empire (Stone, 2016), suggesting a partial memory 
deficit.  
 
A more compelling explanation, I believe, is to view Global Britain as, to borrow Paul Gilroy’s 
terminology, an expression of ‘postcolonial melancholia’ (Gilroy, 2004). Gilroy argues that 
since the end of World War II, British life has been ‘dominated by an inability even to face, 
never mind actually mourn, […] the end of the empire and consequent loss of imperial prestige’ 
(2004: 90). This feeds a ‘melancholic attachment’ to the Empire but also produces ‘a resolutely 
air-brushed version of colonial history in which gunboat diplomacy was moral uplift, civilising 
missions were completed, the trains ran on time and the natives appreciated the value of 
stability’ (Gilroy, 2005). This, in turn, induces an ‘unhealthy and destructive postimperial 
hungering for renewed greatness’ (Gilroy, 2004: 95), of which the Global Britain project is in 
many ways symptomatic. But the air-brushing associated with such melancholia is also 
consciously produced precisely because ‘a sanitized history of the imperial project is required 
by those who wish to bring it back to life’ (Gilroy, 2004: 48). The language of Global Britain 
is exemplary in this respect: it systematically expunges the brutality of the imperial past from 
the collective memory while presenting a morally righteous view of the Empire and its free-
trade ideology as a basis for the country’s future.  
 
Cast in this light, the Global Britain project looks very suspect indeed, not least given the 
heritage populism and associated xenophobia it has been allied with via the Brexit campaign 
(Bristow and Robinson, 2018) and the longer-standing racialised ‘Anglosphere’ discourse 
(Kenny and Pearce, 2018; Vucetic, 2011) of which it is part. The project’s logic also risks 
miring Britain deeper in imperialist rhetoric and military interventionism. Up to the 1970s or 
so, the consensus across Europe was that imperialism was no longer acceptable and indeed 
‘European nations […] discovered […] that prosperity and standard of living did not depend 
on “imperial greatness”’ (Aron, 1974: 260). Yet in the last few decades, Western powers, 
including Britain, and led by the USA, have sought to reverse this historical process, as 
evidenced in, their revival of imperialist discourse (see e.g., Furedi, 1994; Guerlain, 2007) and 
the ‘ghastly and colossal (not to say terroristic) violence […] visited on Afghanistan and Iraq’ 
(Lazarus, 2006: 10) and, more recently, Libya. Moving further in this direction, the UK 
government has recently intensified its military build-up in the Gulf autocracies, including 
reopening a naval support facility in Bahrain, establishing a permanent army base in Oman and 
creating new defence staff centres in Dubai (Vasagar, 2016). Boris Johnson, former Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ebulliently declared in a speech in December 
2016 that ‘Britain is back east of Suez […] projecting British power worldwide.’ These 
activities are all part of what Raphael and St Johns (2016) call the ‘new British imperialism’.  
 
This imperial revivalism goes hand in hand with Britain’s pursuit of free trade with ‘emerging 
markets’, an effort in effect aimed at ensuring the country’s various monopolies, much like in 
the days of the Empire, continue to dominate the world economy. For instance, it ensures access 
to oil and revenues from oil exploitation in the Middle East (British oil companies have 
operations throughout the region) and significant markets for the export of UK military 
equipment (a major sector of the British economy) – Saudi Arabia and the UAE being among 
the world’s top five importers of arms (Fleurant, Wezeman, Wezeman, and Tian, 2017). It also 
secures the markets of the Gulf autocracies for the export of UK services (including higher 
education) – industries which the advocates of Global Britain consider key to their project.4  
 
Also important in this project are mid-income Commonwealth nations such as Ghana and 
Kenya. Evidence points to considerable efforts to restructure these countries into markets for 
UK services. A recent report by Global Justice Now, for instance, reveals how Britain is using 
‘foreign aid’ to privatise or set up private services in their healthcare and education systems 
(Curtis, 2015). In the area of education, the report highlights ‘a strategy to make the 
privatisation of public services more “normal” in developing countries, opening up new 
markets for private education providers, in which UK companies are world leaders’ (see also 
Curtis, 2016). Various other countries are targeted in the Global Britain project, including 
Libya, which the Conservative government assisted in destroying during the 2011 NATO 
military campaign. Revealingly, Boris Johnson declared the country could be turned into ‘the 
next Dubai […] The only thing they’ve got to do is clear the dead bodies away and then we 
will be there’ (Johnson, 2017).  
 
This then is the unspoken reality of Global Britain: not just a project to trade freely beyond 
Europe or, conversely, a mere slogan or fantasy, as many media commentators tend to believe, 
but an integral part of a sustained and dangerous effort in the last few decades to satisfy a 
hunger for renewed imperial greatness as a basis for domestic economic prosperity. It is no 
surprise that, for some, ‘British imperialism remains alive and well’ (Bell, 2016: 76) although, 
of course, it is more accurate to speak of British ‘neo-imperialism’ or ‘neo-colonialism’.5 The 
Global Britain project certainly indicates the imperialist impulse remains strong within 
segments of British society; and, as discussed above, entire sectors of the economy are 
currently being impregnated by it. This development raises important questions about how the 
project is being executed in, and supported by, different sectors of the economy and to what 
effects. In what follows, I reflect on the role of business schools in this project. Business 
                                                          
4 The services sector contributes approximately 80% of the UK’s GDP (Harari, 2018). 
5 In the postcolonial era, British imperialism, like other forms of contemporary Western imperialisms, is not 
synonymous with the imperialism of the days of yore, not least because it is an ‘imperialism without colonies’ 
(see e.g. Magdoff, 2003; Smith, 2016), i.e. one not reliant on direct, formal territorial-military control. It relies 
on more ‘informal’ means such as the co-optation of local elites and the use of foreign aid to ensure former 
colonies remain politically and economically subjugated despite their formal independence. This is what, in an 
earlier period, Gallagher and Robinson (1953) called the ‘imperialism of free trade’ or what Kwame Nkrumah, 
former president of Ghana (1960–66), and intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon perceptively called ‘neo-
colonialism’ (Fanon, 1961; Nkrumah, 1965). Like imperialism, neo-imperialism also involves subjugation 
through discourse and knowledge, as theorized by Said (1993). 
schools are an increasingly vital component of the modern British university and hence an 
important window into the latter, itself considered, as noted above, a key pillar of ‘Global 
Britain’.    
 
Educating for global business 
UK business schools are supposedly anti-Brexit (Grey, 2018) yet, paradoxically, the culture 
pervading them strongly resonates with the discourse of Global Britain. The general view is 
that the schools should be more ‘global’ (see e.g. AACSB, 2011; Ghemawat, 2008). Here, 
globalization means not only selling education to students from around the world and, as part 
of this, setting up international partnerships and satellite campuses but also globalizing the 
curriculum as a means of educating ‘global’ professionals, managers and leaders. Underpinning 
this view is an uncritical commitment to globalization and free trade ideology, in business but 
also in higher education. Just as the advocates of Global Britain put themselves firmly behind 
such ideology, we are told ‘business schools and their alumni must advocate the benefits of a 
globalization effort fueled by lower barriers to trade” (AACSB, 2011: 5, emphasis added). 
Correspondingly, ‘all management educators [are urged] to lead within their institutions to 
instill in future managers a global mindset’ (AACSB, 2011: xii). 
 
With regards to the curriculum, the narrative typically starts with the proposition that 
companies wish to trade freely across countries and build and manage operations accordingly, 
goals that, in turn, call for ‘international’ or ‘global’ management knowledge and skills. To this 
end, an increasing number of programmes with the label ‘international’ or ‘global’ are offered 
at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, with globalization-related content also being infused 
into generalist business curricula. Students are taught global strategy together with related 
topics such as international entrepreneurship, international human resource management and 
global leadership. As part of this, cultural-institutional differences are given much attention 
given these can frustrate international expansion and management but also offer a source of 
competitive advantage through their exploitation. In particular, students are taught to exploit 
cross-national wage differentials by locating parts of the supply chain in ‘emerging markets’ 
where labour costs (and rights) are significantly lower (see e.g. Ghemawat, 2007, 2011). In 
short, the curriculum promotes globalization/free trade and offers guidance on how to translate 
such ideology into concrete managerial action. 
 
Noticeably absent from this dominant narrative is the centrality of imperialism to 
globalization/free trade, both in the past and present. As with ‘Global Britain’, students are 
presented with a view of the phenomenon as a neutral process benefitting all equally and as 
unquestionably a force for good. Yet the historical record shows otherwise. It reveals that 
globalization/free-trade in the last 500 years or so has often been synonymous with colonialism, 
with Western entrepreneurs and trading companies in effect imperiously expanding across the 
world and violently reconfiguring overseas markets and institutions to serve their own 
economic goals. Tharoor (2017: 215) states the problem clearly with specific reference to 19th-
century British imperialism: ‘Free trade was, of course, suited to the British as a slogan, since 
they were the best equipped to profit from it in the nineteenth century, and their guns and laws 
could always stifle what little competition the indigenes could attempt to mount. A 
globalization of equals could well have been worth celebrating, but the globalization of Empire 
was conducted by and above all for the colonizers, and not in the interests of the colonized’. 
Tharoor goes on to show in some detail how such reality resulted in the decimation of once 
thriving, world-class Indian textile and steel industries and systematically prevented 
autonomous local development (see also Chang, 2007). This dimension of globalization/free 
trade in the days of yore and associated practices of slavery, genocide and racial discrimination 
are typically occluded from business school curricula.    
 
In this act of educational erasure, not only is the centrality of imperialism to the 
globalization/free trade of yesteryear expunged from the collective memory but the 
fundamental importance of the imperial past (and present) in shaping contemporary global 
business is also brushed over. Thus, for instance, little is said about how the ‘wage differentials’ 
actively sought and exploited by Western companies are rooted in colonial enterprise and 
sustained by present-day imperialism (see e.g., Smith, 2016). Likewise, scant attention is given 
to how globalization/free trade, much like in the past, operate primarily as ways of advantaging 
countries that ‘already dominate trade, production, services, and finance within the capitalist 
world’ (Harvey, 2003: 15). The history of colonialism and its role in producing this situation 
of unequal exchange and the racial hierarchizing underpinning it are largely left out of the 
curriculum. So is the ‘modern slavery’ (Crane, 2013) which accompanies contemporary 
globalization/free trade via the global value chains controlled by multinationals (Stringer and 
Michailova, 2018).  
 
Equally neglected in the curriculum is the centrality of imperialism to the wider system of 
world governance promoting and structuring contemporary globalization/free trade (see e.g., 
Chang, 2007). Such a system is typically presented as a neutral global business environment 
rather than one facilitating ‘the forcing open of markets throughout the world by institutional 
pressures exercised through the IMF and the WTO’ (Harvey, 2003: 181), organizations 
established and still largely controlled by dominant Western countries. Also overlooked are 
related actors such as Western think-tanks (e.g., the Adam Smith Institute) and professional 
service multinationals whose work and lobbying significantly contribute to making the laws, 
rules and norms favouring and institutionalising globalization/free trade (see e.g., Boussebaa, 
2015, 2017; Boussebaa and Faulconbridge, 2016, 2019; Morgan, 2009). All these actors, in 
collaboration with co-opted or vassalized local elites, form an integral part of contemporary 
imperialisms but are largely obscured in the dominant educational narrative. This is not to 
mention the silence on the military apparatus propping up the system.  
 
Thus, business schools, much like the advocates of Global Britain, preach a partial and highly 
sanitised view of globalization/free trade. The schools are, in effect, populated by, and 
productive of, an army of global business ideologues. Surveying groups of business school 
deans and students as well as business executives on the effects of globalization, Pankaj 
Ghemawat found that: ‘Less than 1 percent of each of the three groups characterized 
globalization as basically bad or mixed. Business undergraduate and graduate students tend to 
feel a bit less gung-ho about globalization than business school deans, but they remain 
significantly more so than the general population (overwhelming majorities of students end up 
believing that globalization is basically good)’ (Ghemawat, 2011: 109). An ardent proponent 
of globalization/free trade, in the corporate world but also in business education, Ghemawat 
fails to comment and reflect upon the fact that such attitudes do not erupt spontaneously; they 
are produced by business schools themselves. The schools in effect normalise 
globalization/free-trade ideology while carefully expunging its (neo)colonial context from the 
collective mind.  
 
The growing body of research adopting a postcolonial theoretical lens represents an important 
attempt to address this problem (see e.g. Banerjee, Carter, and Clegg, 2009; Bell, Kothiyal, and 
Willmott, 2017; Boussebaa, Morgan, and Sturdy, 2012; Prasad, 2003), but it is ‘still a 
somewhat quiet and tentative voice around the margins’ (Jack, Westwood, Srinivas, and 
Sardar, 2011: 275) of orthodox management studies, with the narrative outlined above being 
by far the most predominant account. This is arguably especially the case in the sub-field of 
international business. Here, for instance, Boussebaa (2018: 196) notes how the Journal of 
International Business Studies, the field’s top-ranked journal, ‘has thus far published only one 
paper informed by postcolonial theory […] and the other major IB journals do not fare much 
better.’ Note also how the various reports written about business education and its globalisation 
give – surprisingly or rather tellingly – no consideration whatsoever to the question of 
imperialism (see e.g., AACSB, 2011; Bradshaw, 2017), as if imperial history was of no 
relevance to understanding present-day globalization and as if contemporary imperialism had 
nothing to do with such process.  
 
Thus, business schools are, effectively, complicit in the Global Britain project by virtue of 
propagating the economic-managerial elements of its imperialist discourse. In many ways, such 
complicity reflects, and indeed directly contributes to, a wider educational problem. As 
Tomlinson (2018) puts it, ‘Education in England has never included any coherent 
understanding of the nature of British imperialism, and subsequent de-colonisation, with all the 
brutalities and cruelties this entailed.’ Likewise, the imperial dimension of globalization/free-
trade goes largely unexplained, if not tacitly glorified, in the teaching of business schools. 
Business school students are in effect encouraged to promote free trade and taught how to ‘go 
global’, exploit ‘emerging markets’ and, ultimately, achieve ‘global dominance’, with little 
consideration of the socio-political implications of such globaloney – in other words, they are 
groomed to be agents of neo-imperialism, or at least its corporate arm. In this sense, UK 
business schools operate – wittingly or not – as agents of ‘Global Britain’.    
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the meaning and implications of the Global Britain project cannot be fully 
understood without considering the history (and actuality) of British imperialism. 
Concomitantly, I have suggested business schools can be viewed as advancing this project by 
virtue of teaching and normalising elements of its imperialist discourse.  Where should we go 
from here? My analysis draws attention to the importance of making visible the centrality of 
imperialism to ‘Global Britain’ and the ways in which it is being incorporated into, and being 
promoted by, various sectors of the economy. I believe this should be a core concern for 
management scholars, and business schools a primary research site given their importance to 
‘Global Britain’.  
 
More specifically, further research on the business school curriculum and ongoing efforts to 
globalize it within individual schools is required. As part of this, research is needed on the 
wider institutional context surrounding this development. The role of businesses, particularly 
multinationals, is an obvious area to scrutinise but less visible and yet no doubt significant are 
accreditation agencies such as the AACSB. Research is also required at the micro (individual) 
level – if, as I have suggested, UK management education is shaping students as global business 
ideologues, then, an important line of future research might investigate the processes of identity 
regulation and identity work involved in this effort (see Boussebaa, 2020). Research should 
also focus on how the ‘flying of the flag’ of British management education overseas is 
responded to in the various ‘emerging markets’ being targeted by the advocates of Global 
Britain. Finally, a historical analysis of the evolution of UK business schools and their growing 
attentiveness to globalization would be especially useful, allowing us to clarify the roots of the 
association between imperialist discourse and management education: does it hark back to the 
first effort to establish British management education after World War II (Tiratsoo, 1998) or is 
it more recent, emerging from the legacy of Thatcherism and the Americanisation of UK 
business schools (Tiratsoo, 2004)? 
 
Here, it is important to note that my analysis is not uniquely relevant to Britain – the shadow 
of empire does not only hang over the UK. Other former colonial powers such as France have 
also been hungering for renewed imperial greatness and exhibiting identity politics not unlike 
that associated with the Global Britain project. One could point to other cases such as Russia 
and Turkey who also anchor ongoing attempts to recover ‘greatness’ in nostalgia for their lost 
Soviet and Ottoman empires, respectively. Particularly interesting is China, a country once 
subject to European powers but also one with its own history of imperialism in Asia and now 
a new potential superpower and one whose globalization project is beginning to attract critical 
scrutiny, especially in the context of Africa (see e.g. Jackson, 2012). This is not to mention the 
USA’s ‘Make America Great Again’ project. Research is needed on such projects, how they 
compare with that of ‘Global Britain’ and what role business schools play in them. Comparative 
research may also assist in shedding light on how the apparently separate – national – projects 
may be entwined.   
 
Beyond research, I believe management scholars should also intervene in their capacity as 
educators. I agree with Fleming and Ozwick (2014: 576) that the business school can be 
reconfigured as ‘a site for critical and progressive institutional change, especially pertaining to 
the question of pedagogy.’ Here, it would be beneficial to introduce postcolonial approaches 
as a standard part of ‘international’ programmes and while also infusing them into generalist 
business curricula. This is, of course, already being achieved by postcolonial scholars but, as 
mentioned above, the contribution remains on the periphery of the field and thus needs re-
doubling. As part of this, efforts to influence the work of accreditation agencies are also 
required. These agencies have taken it upon themselves to globalize the school curriculum, yet 
their narrative propagates a highly sanitised, decontextualized view of globalization. I believe 
the question of imperialism should be injected into such narrative. This would assist in 
producing a less imperialistic form of business education. It might also help in addressing the 
postcolonial melancholia afflicting former colonial powers and the ‘pathology of greatness’ 
(Gilroy, 2004: 89) and associated identity politics it engenders while also raising awareness 
about new forms of imperialism in the 21st century.  
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